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Will capital controls enhance macro economy stability? How will the results be influenced 
by the exchange rate regime and monetary policy reaction? Are the consequences of policy 
decisions involving capital controls easily predictable, or more complicated than may have been 
anticipated? The first chapter of this dissertation will answer the above questions by investigating 
the macroeconomic dynamics of a small open economy. In recent years, these matters have become 
particularly important to emerging market economies, which have often adopted capital controls. 
We especially investigate two dynamical characteristics: indeterminacy and bifurcation. Four 
cases are explored, based on different exchange rate regimes and monetary policy rules. 
Compared with flexible exchange rates, the fixed exchange rate regime should be a more 
careful policy choice due to the economic complexities. Firstly, more factors need to be considered 
for economic stability, such as the stickiness of prices and the elasticity of substitution between 
labor and consumption. Secondly, fixed exchange rate regimes with capital controls produce larger 
posterior probability of the indeterminate region than a flexible exchange rate regime. Thirdly, we 
prove the existence of Hopf bifurcation under capital controls with fixed exchange rates and 
current-looking monetary policy. Numerically, more types of bifurcation are detected under this 
policy combination. 
With capital controls in place, we find that indeterminacy depends upon how the interest 
rate feedback to inflation and to output gap coordinate with each other in the Taylor rule. When 
forward-looking, both passive and positive monetary policy feedback can lead to indeterminacy. 
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We provide monetary policy suggestions on achieving macroeconomic stability through 
financial regulation and references for countries facing different choices on exchange rate regimes. 
As a complement for the first chapter, the second chapter of this dissertation examines the 
dynamics of exchange rate as a diffusion process under flexible exchange rate regimes. When 
exchange rates are free floating, they are known as highly volatile, nonstationary. They are also 
hard to be explained and predicted by fundamentals, such as output, price level and monetary 
supply. This chapter uses both nonparametric method and parametric method (MLE) to estimate 
exchange rate as a diffusion process. In line with previous literature’s finding, the nonparametric 
drift estimators show some nonlinearity. The result of parametric estimation shows that Geometric 
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Since the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crisis, the potential problems 
caused by free capital movements among countries have drawn attention to the relationship 
between financial regulation, capital controls, and macroeconomic stability.  
Some researchers support capital controls with prudential macroeconomic policy. 
According to that view, capital controls can mitigate systemic risk, reduce business cycle 
volatility, and increase macroeconomic stability. Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014) and Korinek 
(2011, 2014) study welfare implications of capital controls from a theoretic perspective, while 
Ostry et al. (2012) and Magud et al. (2012) investigate the relationship of capital controls to 
macroeconomic stability using empirical methods. 
According to IMF’s capital account openness index (Table 1), several countries in the 
world are imposing more strict capital controls than other countries, especially those countries 
which are categorized as emerging market economies. This capital account openness index 
ranges between 0 to 1, with 1 indicating a fully liberalized capital account. India, Bangladesh 
and China has the index numbers as 0.02, 0.02 and 0.09 respectively, close to the level of fully 
closed capital account. Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey and Algeria also have the index 
smaller than 0.5, showing the strictness of capital controls. 
When the role of capital controls in stabilizing the economy is emphasized, however, the 
roles of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy should not be overlooked, especially in an 
open economy. According to Mundell’s (1963) “impossible trinity” in international economics, 
an open economy can not simultaneously have independent monetary policy, fixed exchange 
3 
 
rates, and free capital movement.1 Besides the openness of capital account, the choice of 
exchange regimes and monetary policies should also be taken into important consideration to 
keep the economic stability. 
Table 2 shows the exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks of the major 
countries that impose strict capital controls. As shown in this table, not all of these countries 
choose the same exchange rate regime and monetary policy framework. Instead, some of them 
have floating exchange rate regime and inflation-targeting framework, such as Brazil, Mexico, 
India, Thailand and Turkey. While some of them choose managed exchange rates or fixed 
exchange rates, and monetary aggregare target, such as China, Bangladesh and Algeria. 
These differences in exchange rate regimes and monetary policies show us the other 
intriguing facets of the international macroprudential architecture. How the choices of 
exchange rate regime and monetary policy influence the stabilization effect of capital control? 
Is it possible that the choices of exchange rate regime and monetary policy could generate 
instability and increased volatility, even though capital flows are controlled? What is the 
implication for the choices of exchange rate regime and monetary policy in an open economy 
that imposes capital control? 
To answer the above questions, we investigate the effects of combinations of exchange rate 
regimes and monetary policies in stabilizing the economy under prudential macroeconomic 
policy with control of capital flows. Four cases are studied. They are flexible exchange rate 
with current looking monetary policy, fixed exchange rate with current looking monetary 
                                                          
1 Mundell’s (1963) “impossible trinity” is alternatively often called the “Mundell-Fleming trilemma” to 
recognize the relevancy of Fleming (1962). 
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policy, flexible exchange rate with forward looking monetary policy and fixed exchange rate 
with forward looking monetary policy. 
In addition to different choices on exchange rate regimes and monetary policies, the 
property of economic stability should be further investigated, such as indeterminacy and 
bifurcation. What are the economic complexities that policy makers should be aware of under 
each case? How to make policy decisions and to what extent the policy should be adjusted are 
challenging questions relevant to all monetary authorities. This paper investigates the possible 
instability or non-uniqueness of equilibria and their relevancy to policy under capital controls. 
Indeterminacy occurs if the equilibrium of an economic system is not unique, resulting in 
the existence of multiple equilibria. Under those circumstances, consumers’ and firms’ 
forecasts of macroeconomic variables, such as output and inflation rates, can lead to the 
phenomenon of “self-fulfilling prophecy.” The economy can move from one equilibrium to 
another. A new equilibrium, driven by economic agents’ beliefs, could be a better one or a 
worse one. If capital controls signal to people that they are protected from the risk of 
international financial market volatility, then the beliefs-driven equilibrium may be better. 
Alternatively, if imposition of capital controls produces panic and induces evasion of the 
controls, the equilibrium can be worse. As a result, we investigate existence of multiple 
equilibria in an open economy with different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies. We 
also empirically examine indeterminacy using Bayesian methods to estimate the probability of 
the indeterminacy region.  We acquire the posterior estimates of parameters, the impulse 
responses and the variance decomposition under both fundamental shocks and sunspot shocks. 
We find that the existence of indeterminacy depends upon how the interest rate feedback 
to inflation and output gap coordinate with each other in the Taylor rule. Our results expand 
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the conclusions of previous literature on indeterminacy and monetary policy to the case of 
capital controls. When monetary policy is forward looking with capital controls,  we find that 
both passive feedback and positive feedback can generate indeterminacy.2 
The exchange rate regime can alter the conditions for indeterminacy. Compared with 
flexible exchange rates, a fixed exchange regime produces more complex conditions, 
depending on the stickiness of price setting and the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
consumption. Interestingly, the degree of openness does not play a large role in our results. 
This difference from previous literature is associated with the control of international capital 
mobility. 
We introduce into our model staggered price setting. We find that when price is close to 
flexible with capital controls, indeterminacy is possible. 
The other primary objective of our paper is to investigate existence of bifurcation 
phenomena in an open economy with capital controls. Bifurcation is definined to occur, if a 
qualitative change in dynamics occurs, when the bifurcation boundary is crossed by the deep 
parameters of the economy’s structure. Such deep parameters are not only those of private 
tastes and technology, but also of monetary policy rules. Such qualitative change can be 
between instability and stability. But the change can also be between different kinds of 
instability or between different kinds of stability, such as monotonic stability and periodic 
damped stability, or multiperiodic damped stabilitiy. Existence of bifurcation boundaries can 
                                                          
2 With passive feedback, the parameter multiplied by inflation or output gap in Taylor rule is defined to be 
between 0 and 1. With positive feedback, the parameter is larger than 1. Eventhough in existing literature about 
New Keynesian model and Taylor rule, the role of interest rate feedback to inflation is more emphasized than 
the role of interesit ratae feedback to output gap, we assume these two feedback have parallel weight in our 
model. As is shown from the Bayesian estimation results in this paper, the policy reponses to inflation and 
output gap do not have large difference under certain cases. This is different from a standard calibration result 
in previous literature. 
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motivate policy intervention. A slight change to the parameters of private tastes or technology 
or to the parameters of central bank’s feedback to output and inflation can induce a 
fundamental change in the nature of the economy’s dynamics. 
We find that there can exist Hopf bifurcation under capital controls, fixed exchange rates, 
and current-looking monetary policy. We determine the conditions under which the monetary 
policy rule or private deep parameters will generate instability. We find several kinds of 
bifurcation numerically, when the model’s parameters are estimated by Bayesian methods. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
 
On the indeterminacy and monetary policy implications in macroeconomics, Benhabib and 
Farmer (1999) summarize the indeterminacy and sunspots in macroeconomic models, including 
real models, monetary models, models of endogenous growth and policy feedback. Benhabib et al. 
(2001) find that the conditions under which interest rate feedback to inflation generates multiple 
equilibria depend not only on the monetary-fiscal regime but also on the role of money in 
preferences and technology. They show positive monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria and 
passive monetary policy keeps the equilibrium uinique. Airaudo and Zanna (2012) analyze global 
equilibrium determinacy in a flexible-price open economy with active interest rate rules on 
inflation. They find that the ex ante elasticity of the real exchange rate to the policy interest rate 
determines the existence of endogenous cycles and chaos. This elasticity is influenced importantly 
by the degree of trade openness. Keating and Smith (2013) include nominal money growth in 
Central bank’s interest rate rules and study the determinacy properties of such rules. They show 
that whether the equilibrium is unique or not depends on the method of aggregation. Targeting the 
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growth rate of the true monetary aggregate will generate a unique equilibrium and this result also 
extends to the Divisia monetary aggregate growth rate. 
On the estimation of DSGE model with indeterminacy, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) 
provide the Bayesian estimation of a prototypical New Keynesian model. They construct the 
posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region and estimates for the propagation 
of fundamental and sunspot shocks. During Volcker period, the positive monetary policy put the 
U.S. economy into the determinacy region. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) study the effect of 
sunspot shocks through endogenous forecast errors under indeterminacy. The effect  of 
fundamental shocks on forecast erros is not uniquely determined. Under passive interest rate 
feedback, the response of inflation to an unanticipated interest rate cut is ambiguous. Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2007) use Bayesian methods to study the conduct of monetary policy in a small open 
economy. The results show that the central banks of Australia and New Zealand do not target 
exchange rates. The Bank of Canada and the Bank of England respond to exchange rate movements. 
Farmer et al. (2015) provide a method for solving and estimating linear rational expectations 
models with indeterminacy. Their method redefines a subset of expectational errors as new 
fundamentals, which treats the indeterminate models as determinate and possible to be solved by 
standard solution algorithms. Zheng and Guo (2013) estimate a small open economy DSGE model 
with indeterminacy. The empirical results of China show that Chinese monetary policy reacts not 
only to inflation and output gap, but also to the exchange rate movements. 
On capital controls and exchange rate regimes, Farhi and Werning (2014) study the optimal 
capital controls in a small open economy with nominal rigidities. They find capital controls are 
desirable even when the exchange rate is flexible. In Farhi and Werning (2012), they find capital 
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contols are effective to address risk-premium shocks and the solution depnds on the degree of 
nominal rigidity and the openness of the economy. 
The previous literature investigating bifurcation without capital controls includes Barnett 
and Duzhak (2008, 2010, 2014), Barnett and Eryilmaz (2013, 2014), and the survey paper Barnett 
and Chen (2015). Barnett and Duzhak (2008, 2010) explore bifurcations within the class of New 
Keynesian models. They find the existence of Hopf bifurcation and Period Doubling bifurcation. 
They study cases of current-looking Taylor Rule, forward-looking Taylor Rule, Hybrid Taylor 
Rule, backward-looking Taylor Rule and Taylor Rule with interest rate smoothing term. Barnett 
and Duzhak (2014) explore bifurcations with regime switching monetary policies. Barnett and 
Eryilmaz (2013, 2014) find bifurcations in the open economy New Keynesian models. Compared 
with closed economy models, the open economy models generate more complex dynamics. In 
contrast, we introduce capital controls and the exchange rate peg into the open economy New 
Keynesian model. Without capital controls, Woodford (1986, 1992) and Franke (1992) find that 




In light of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014), our model is 
an open economy New Keynesian model consisting of a small open economy that imposes 
capital controls and chooses between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates. 
Compared with the Mundell Fleming IS-LM-BP model, the New Keynesian model has solid 
micro-foundation on both the demand side and the supply side. As a result, we are able to 
analyze the influence of the deep structural parameters on the economy’s dynamics. 
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In contrast with Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014), we choose the discrete time version of 
the linear rational expectations model, instead of the continuous time model, to facilitate 
analyzing the indeterminacy and bifurcation conditions. For analyzing indeterminacy, the 
linear rational expectations model automatically fixes the list of predetermined variables, 
thereby eliminating the need to differentiate between predetermined variables and jump 
variables.3 Discrete time also permits location of bifurcation boundaries in linear system, as in 
Barnett and Duzhak (2008, 2010, and 2014) and Barnett and Eryilmaz (2013, 2014). In 
addition, rational expectations allows us to differentiate between fundamental shocks and non-
fundamental forecasting errors. Farmer et al. (2015) and Beyer and Farmer (2004) find 
methods to change the system from indeterminate to determinate by moving the non-
fundamental forecasting errors.  The number of those errors equals the degree of indeterminacy 
to the fundamental shocks set. In the rational expectations model, it is possible for beliefs to 
drive the economy to another path that converges to a steady state, producing a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. In principle, it is possible to regulate or influence those beliefs. This phenomenon is 
different from “animal spirit.” 
There is a continuum of small open economies, indexed along the unit interval. Different 
economies share identical preferences, technology, and market structure. Following the 
conventions in this literature, we use variables without i-index to refer to the small open 
economy being modelled. Variables with i-index refer to variables in economy i, among the 
continuum of economies making up the world economy. Variables with a star correspond to 
the world economy as a whole, while j denotes a particular good within an economy. 
                                                          






A representative household seeks to maximize 
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where tN  denotes hours of labor, tC  is a composite consumption index defined by 
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  . 
The parameter ε  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among goods within any given 
country. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of home bias in preferences and is an 
index of openness, while   > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods, and γ measures the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in different 
countries. 
The household’s budget constraint takes the form 
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where 1tD   is holding of the home portfolio, consisting of shares in firms. Holding of country 
i’s portfolio is 1
i
tD  , while , 1t tQ   is the price of the home portfolio, and , 1
i
t tQ  is the price of 
country i’s portfolio. The nominal wage is tW . The lump-sum transfer/tax at t is tT . We model 
the capital control, following Farhi and Werning (2014), with t  denoting the subsidy on capital 
outflows (tax on capital inflows) in home country and 
i
t  denoting the subsidy on capital 
outflows (tax on capital inflows) in country i. We assume that country i does not impose capital 
control, so that 
i
t  = 0. Taxes on capital inflows are rebated as a lump sum to households. We 












, following Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014). 
After the derivation that is shown in Appendix 1,  the budget constraint can be rewritten as 
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The log-linearized form is 
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t t ti i i i i i i i t
t t t t t t t t t t t
i t i t
Q D D




      
  
.                                                 (7) 
Notice that there is no capital control in country i. 












t i i i
t t t t
i i
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t i i i

















      
      
      
       
        
       










  is the real exchange rate. 





t t t i tC C
  .                                                                                                                                         (9) 
Taking logs on both sides and integrating over i, we get 
* 1
t t t tc c q 





1.3.2. Uncovered Interest Parity 
 
The pricing equation for foreign bonds and domestic bonds are respectively 
   








t t t t









                                                                                                                    (11) 
We combine them to get the Uncovered Interest Parity conditions, 




R R    
Taking logs on both sides, we get                                                                                                                                    
   * 1 1t t t t t t tr r E E e e      ,                                                                                                  (12) 












     . 
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), under the purchasing power parity condition, , ,H t F tP P . 
The bilateral nominal exchange rate is defined by the law of one price, , , ,( ) ( )
i
i t i t i tP j P j ,  
where , ( )
i
i tP j  is the price of country i’s good j, expressed in country i’s currency. It follows 
that , , ,
i





t i t di
   . 












We can rewrite the uncovered interest parity condition as 




The supply side in this paper is the same as in Gali and Monacelli (2005). Details of the 
derivation can be found in their paper.  
A representative firm in the home country has a linear technology, 






































The firm follows staggered-price setting, as in Calvo’s (1983) model. Each period, 1   of 
firms set new prices. The pricing decision is forward-looking. Firms set the price as a mark-up 
over a weighted average of expected future marginal costs. As 0  , the price approaches 
flexibility. 
The dynamics of domestic inflation are given by 












In this section, we assume that 1      (Cole-Obstfeld case). 
1.3.4.1. Demand Side 
 




( ) ( ) ( )it H t H tY j C j C j di                                                                                                                 (16) 
           
1






H t H t H t F t i
t ti i
H t t i t F t t
P j P P P
C C di
P P P P
  
 
         
                      
  . 
After the derivation in Appendix, we get 
        1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t t t t ty E y r E E s s E                     .                                          (17) 
1.3.4.2. Supply Side 
 
At the steady state of the economy, we have 
t t ty a n  .                                                                                                                                                          (18) 
The deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state is 
  1t t t t t t t t tmc mc mc c n s a y a                     . 
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Thus at equilibrium, the dynamic equation for inflation is 
         , , 1 , 1 1 1H t t H t t t H t t t tE mc E y a                        .             (19) 
1.3.4.3. Equilibrium Dynamics in Output Gap 
 
The output gap is defined to be the following deviation of output from its natural level: 
t t tx y y  . 
The dynamics of the economy with capital controls and flexible exchange rates, but without 
monetary policy, can be written as 
       1 , 1 1 1
1
t t t t t H t t t t t t tx E x r E E a a E

   

   
                
,                                (20) 
   , , 1 1H t t H t tE x       ,                                                                                                                 (21) 
       * *1 1 , 1 1t t t t t t t t t H t t tr r E E s s E E                   . 
If the exchange rate is fixed, then 1t te e  , 
 * 1t t t t tr r E       .  
In the following sections of this paper, we assume that purchasing power parity holds, so that 
1tS  and  1 0t t tE s s     . 
1.3.5. Capital Control, Exchange Rate Regime and 




In this section, we summarize four cases of the dynamical system, such that the exchange 
rate regime can be flexible or fixed and monetary policy can be current-looking or forward-
looking. 
1.3.5.1. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking 
Monetary Policy 
 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
* *
1 , 1 1
,
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ),
.
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t t H t t t
t H t x t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E E E
r a a x
   

  
       

  
    
 

   

    
   

                                   (22) 
1.3.5.2. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking 
Monetary Policy 
 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 





( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ],
.
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t
t H t x t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E
r a a x
   








   

    
 

                                  (23) 
1.3.5.3. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 
Monetary Policy 
 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
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1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 1
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ).
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t t H t t t
t t H t x t t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E E E
r a E a E x




       

  
    
 

   

    
   

                                      (24) 
1.3.5.4. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 
Monetary Policy 
 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 





( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ],
( ) ( ).
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t
t t H t x t t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E
r a E a E x










   

    
 

                                     (25) 
The four cases have the same IS curve and Phillips curve. The differences lie in the 
uncovered interest parity conditions between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates, 
and in the interest rate feedback rule between current-looking monetary policy and forward-
looking monetary policy.  
It should be observed that our uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition is somewhat 
unusual. The usual UIP condition mainly describes the relationship between exchange rates 
and nominal interest rates. In our UIP condition, the nominal interest rate depends upon capital 
controls and upon how large the expectation of future domestic inflation will deviate from 
world inflation.  
If the capital flow is free, so that  1 1 0t t t       , then under fixed exchange rates, 
the domestic nominal interest rate should equal the world nominal interest rate. As a result, the 
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monetary authority loses its autonomy, in accordance with Mundell’s trilemma. Second, under 
flexible exchange rates, the expectation of future world inflation plays a role in the dynamical 
system. Even though the domestic government stops targeting exchange rates and allows the 
exchange rate to float freely, the system is still influenced by expectations of the world inflation.  
We also investigate how expectations about future domestic inflation and output gap 
change the results of our analysis, compared with current-looking monetary policy with the 
central bank setting the nominal interest rate. 
 
1.4. Indeterminacy Conditions 
 
In this section we investigate the indeterminacy conditions for the four cases of policy 
combinations. We follow the method for linear rational expectations models by Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Lubik and Marzo (2007), Sims (2002), 
Farmer et al. (2015), Beyer and Farmer (2004).  
In Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), the indeterminacy condition is provided as follows. First, 
the system can be written as 
0 1 1t t t t  Γ X Γ X Ψε Πη ,                                                                                                      (26) 
where tX is the 1n  vector of endogenous variables and their expectations, while tε  is the 
1l  vector of exogenous variables, and tη is the 1k  vector of non-fundamental forecasting 
errors. Those forecast errors represent beliefs and permit self-fulfilling equilibria. 




0 1 1 0 0t t t t
  
  X Γ Γ X Γ Ψε Γ Πη .                                                                                          (27) 
Applying generalized Schur decomposition (also called QZ decomposition) and letting 
t t
w Z X , the equation above can be written as 
1, 1, 1 1.11 12 11 12








        
          
        
w w QΛ Λ Ω Ω
Ψε Πη
w w QΛ Ω
.                                       (28) 
It is assumed that the following 1m  vector, 2,tw , is purely explosive, where 0 m n  : 
1 1
2, 22 22 2, 1 22 2.( )t t t t
 
  w Λ Ω w Λ Q Ψε Πη .  
A non-explosive solution of the linear rational expectation model for tX exists, if 2,0 w 0  and 
2. 2. 0t t Q Ψε Q Πη .  
By singular value decomposition of 2.Q Π , we find  
  .1112. .1 .2 .1 11 .1
.2
  
         
VD 0
Q Π UDV U U U D V
V0 0
 .                                                             (29) 
The m explosive components of tX generate r m  restrictions for the expectation errors. The 
stability condition can be rewritten as 
.1 11 .1 .1( ) 0t t  U D V λε V η .                                                                                                        (30) 
Let 1 2t t t η A ε A ζ  , where tζ  is a 1p  vector of sunspot shocks. The solution for the 
forecast errors is 
1
.1 11 .1 2. .2 1 .2 2( )t t t
    η V D U Q Ψ V M ε V M ζ .                                                                              (31) 
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When the dimension of the vector of forecast errors, k, equals the number of stability 
restrictions, r, the linear rational expectations model has a unique solution. When k r , there 
is indeterminacy (multiple stable solutions), and k - r is the degree of indeterminacy. 
 
1.4.1. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 1. Under capital control, flexible exchange rate and current-looking monetary 
policy, there exists one degree of indeterminacy, when ( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0xa a       . 
Proof. see Appendix 7. 










.                                                                                                                              (32) 
Indeterminacy is mainly determined by the values of a , xa and . To satisfy this inequality, 
a  must be between zero and one. If is large, then xa  can be large or small, so long as is 
sufficiently larger than xa . If is small, xa has to be small to generate indeterminacy. 
Thus, indeterminacy is most likely to happen under passive interest rate feedback on 
inflation and flexible price. If price is sticky, the passive interest rate feedback on output gap 
in addition to inflation will also produce the multiple equilibria. 
As has been analyzed by Bullard and Schaling (2006), when a is between zero and one, 
the Taylor principle is violated. In this situation, nominal interest rates rise by less than the 
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increase in the inflation, leading a decrease in the real interest rate. This drop in real interest 
rate makes the output gap larger through the IS curve equation. And a rise in the output gap 
will increase the inflation through the Phillips curve equation. Thus, a passive monetary policy 
response on inflation will enlarge the inflation level, making the economy move further away 
from the unique equilibrium. 
 
1.4.2. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 2. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary 
policy, there exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 
2( 1) ( 1) [ ( 1) ] 0xa a            . 
Proof. see Appendix 8. 
This condition can be rewritten as 






   .                                                                                       (33) 
Since 1 0  , to satisfy this inequality, we must have 1 0    . In addition, a  and 
xa can not be too large. The economic intuition behind these conditions is that the price has to 





1.4.3. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 3. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary 
policy, there exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 
1









    
  or  
1









    
. 
Proof. see Appendix 9. 
































.                                                                         (34) 
Compared with Case 1, Case 3 must consider xa  first. When xa is small, only if a  is 
between zero and one, there may exist indeterminacy. When xa  is large, there are two 
possibilities for indeterminacy to appear. One is that a  is also large. The other is when   is 
small. 
Thus, under forward-looking monetary policy, the interest rate feedback on the output gap 
matters more than the interest rate feedback on the inflation. Both passive and positive 





1.4.4. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 4. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary 
policy, there exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 
1






   
 

     
  or  
1






   
 

     
. 
Proof. see Appendix 10. 

































   
.                                                              (35) 
This case is similar to Case 3. When xa is small, only if a  is between zero and one, 
indeterminacy is possible to exist. When xa  is large, either a large a  or a small   will 
produce multiple quilibria.  
Different from Case 3, the restrictions that are put on interest rate feedback on inflation and 
output gap are looser. This indicates that in the monetary policy parameter space, the chance 
to generate indeterminacy is higher under the fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
1.5. Bifurcation Conditions 
 
In this section, we investigate the existence of bifurcation in the system under the four 
policy cases. With Hopf bifurcation, the economy can converge to a stable limit cycle or 
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diverge from an unstable limit cycle. We use the following theorem from Gandolfo (2010) to 
determine conditions for the existence of Hopf bifurcation. 
Theorem.  Consider the system, 1 ( , )t ty y   . Suppose that for each α in the relevant interval, 
the system has a smooth family of equilibrium points, ( )e ey y  , at which the eigenvalues 
are complex conjugates, 1,2 ( ) ( )i      . If there is a critical value, 0 , of the parameter α 
such that 
(1) the eigenvalues’ modulus becomes unity at 0 , but the eigenvalues are not roots of unity 
(from the first up to the fourth), namely 
2 2
1,2 0 1,2 0( ) 1, ( ) 1












then there is an invariant closed curve bifurcating from 0 .  
1.5.1. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 5. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and current-looking monetary 
policy, there would exist Hopf bifurcation, if 
2 2[( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1) (1 ) 0xa a              and ( 1)(1 ) 0xa a       . 
However, according to the meaning of the parameters, the second equation cannot be 
satisfied. 
Proof. see Appendix 11. 
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1.5.2. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 6. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary 
policy, there exists Hopf bifurcation, when
2 2[( 1)( ) ] 4 ( 1) ( 1 ) 0xa a               and
2(1 )( 1) (1 )( 1) ( 1) 0xa a                 . 
Since




 with 0 < β < 1, and 0 < ω < 1, it follows that   goes to , when ω 
approaches 0. In this case, it is possible for the second equality to hold. 
Proof. see Appendix 11. 
The condition will be satisfied when  is larger than one, which happens when price is 
flexible. 
1.5.3. Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 7. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary 
policy, there could exist Hopf bifurcation, if
2[( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)(1 )( 1 ) 0x xa a a a                    and
(1 )( 1) 0xa      . However, according to the economic meaning of the parameters, the 
second equation cannot be satisfied with parameter values within their feasible range. 
Proof. see Appendix 11. 
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1.5.4. Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-
looking Monetary Policy 
 
Proposition 8. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary 
policy, there could exist Hopf bifurcation, if
2[( ( 1 ) 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)( 1 )( 1 ) 0x xa a a a                      and
(1 )( 1) 0xa      . However, according to the meaning of the parameters, the second 
equation cannot be satisfied. 
Proof. see Appendix 11. 
 
 
1.6. Empirical Test for Indeterminacy 
 
 
In this chapter, we test indeterminacy using Bayesian likelihood estimation, following Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2004). We compute the posterior probability of the determinate and the 
indeterminate regions of the parameter space. Then we estimate the parameters’ posterior 
means and 90-percent probability intervals. We also study impulse responses of the 
fundamental and sunspot shocks. Last, we compute variance decompositions to study the 





1.6.1. Model for Testing Indeterminacy: Four Cases 
 
     Case1: Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy 
In this case, the model is: 
 1 1,
, 1 , 2,
* *











[ ] [ ] ,
1 1 1 1





t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t H t t t t
H t t H t t
t H t x t r t
t z t z t




x E x r E z r
E x











   
      












   




   
                                   (36) 
which can be written as 
0 1 1
1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
,




Γ θ s Γ θ s Ψ θ ε Π θ η
η A ε A ζ
             (37) 
with  
 
    
* *
, 1 , 1
, , , ,
1 , 1 ,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, .
t t H t t t t t H t t t t
t r t z t R t t
t t t t H t t H t
x r E x E z r
x E x E
 
 
     
   






   
 
  
The law of motion for 
ts can be written as: 
* *
1 1 1 2 .2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t   s Γ θ s Β θ ε Β θ ε Π θ V θ Μ ζ .                                                         (38) 
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Details about the above matrices can be found in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). 
 
Case 2: Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy 
In this case, the model is: 
 1 1,
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1 1
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H t t H t t
t t t t t H t t t
H t t H t t
t H t x t r t
t z t z t
t R t R t
x E x
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x E x r E z r
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   
















                                                              (39) 
which can be written as (37) with 
 
    
*
, 1 , 1
, , ,
1 , 1 ,
, , , , , , ,
, , ,
, .
t t H t t t t t H t t t
t r t z t R t
t t t t H t t H t
x r E x E z r
x E x E
 
 
     
   









Case 3: Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
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Case 4: Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
In this case, the model is: 
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which can be written as (37) with 
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1.6.2. Data Description: China 1999(1) to 2004(4) and 
2011(4) to 2017(3) 
 
We choose China as the example of a small open economy which imposes capital control 
and has the time periods of two exchange rate regimes. There are several reasons for this choice. 
First, for the common examples of small open economies, such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK, they have seldom imposed controls on capital flows in history. Second, 
among the major emerging market economies which impose capital control as discussed in the 
introduction, not many of them have experienced both flexible exchange rate regimes and fixed 
exchange rate regimes during the periods of capital contols. Thus, we take China as the sample 
economy for our estimation. As shown in the figure of China/U.S. foreign exchange rate, we 
take the period of 1999(1) to 2004(4) as the time of fixed exchange rate regimes. And 2011(4) 
to 2017(3) are selected as the sample for flexible exchange rate regimes. The models of Case 
1 and Case 3 are fitted to the data of 2011(4) to 2017(3). Case 2 and Case 4 are fitted to the 
data of 1999(1) to 2004(4). 
We use quarterly data from the database, FRED, of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
The output level is measured as the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We take the HP trend 
of real GDP as the potential output level of China. The output gap is calculated as the log of 
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real GDP minus the log of HP trend. Inflation is measured as the log of Consumer Prive Index 
(CPI). The nominal interest rate is the central bank rates for China. 
The prior means and densities are chosen based on previous research, such as Lubik and 
Frank (2004), Lubik and Frank (2007) and Zheng and Guo (2013). Notice that the period of 
1999(1) to 2004(4) in China is the time under passive interest rate feedback to inflation, so we 
set the prior mean of a to be 0.8. While during 2011(4) to 2017(3) in China, the interest rate 
feedback to inflation is positive. We set the prior mean of a to be 1.1. 
Following previous literature, the monetary policy parameters follow Gamma distribution. 
The parameter for price sticknes follows Beta distribution. The correlations between shocks 
follow Normal distribution. The exogenous shocks follow Inverse Gamma distribution. 
 
1.6.3. Parameter Estimation 
 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy in China, the 
posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 2.33. And the interest rate feedback 
to output gap xa  is 0.46. If inflation increases by 1%, the nominal interest rate raises by 233 
base points. If real output is 1% higher than its potential level, the nominal interest rate 
responses by increasing 46 base points. There exist correlations between fundamental shocks. 
And indeterminacy can influence the transmission of structural shocks related to monetary 
policy, technology, foreign interest rate and foreign inflation.   equals to 0.99, which reflects 
that the price is very sticky. 
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Under the fixed exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy in China, the 
posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 0.22. And the interest rate feedback 
to output gap xa  is 0.22. Unlike the standard calibration results of a New Keynesian model, 
the interest rate feedback to inflation and output gap has similar weight in the monetary policy 
response function. 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime and forward-looking monetary policy in China, 
the posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 0.59. And the interest rate 
feedback to output gap xa  is 0.42. These two feedback has similar weight in the monetary 
policy response function. The correlations between fundamental shocks exist. And the 
transmission of these fundamental shocks is also influenced by the indeterminacy. Price is very 
sticky. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime and forward-looking monetary policy in China, the 
posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 0.31. And the interest rate feedback 
to output gap xa  is 0.29. These two feedback has similar weight in the monetary policy 
response function. 
 
1.6.4. Posterior Probability of the Determinate and the 
Indeterminate Regions 
 
The posterior probabilities of the determinate and indeterminate regions indicate that 




The forward-looking monetary policy reduces the probability of indeterminate region under 
flexible exchange rate regimes. However, under fixed exchange rate regimes, a forward-
looking monetary policy increases the probability of indeterminacy. 
 
1.6.5. Impulse Responses 
 
Under flexible exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy, an unanticipated 
tightening of monetary policy reduces output and inflation. Interest rate increases immediately. 
One unit positive technology shock increases output, inflation and interest rate permanently. 
In response to foreign interest rate shock, output, inflation and interest rate increase 
permanently. This increase of domestic interest rate in response to foreign interest shock shows 
the dependence of monetary policy, even under the controlled capital flows and flexible 
exchange rates. Foreign inflation shock only takes effect under flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Under foreign inflation shock, output, inflation and interest rate decrease permanently. In 
response to sunspot driven inflationary expectation, output firstly decreases and then increases 
permanently. Interest rate also increases permanently. It firstly jumps up and then drops to a 
lower positive level. 
Under the same exchange rate regime, there are some differences in the impulse responses 
when monetary policy is forward looking. First, all the responses of output, inflation and 
interest rate go back to their steady states in the long run. Second, under a positive technology 
shock, output and interest rate firstly increase and then decrease. Third, inflation decreases in 
response to both technology shock and foreign interest rate shock. This response of inflation 
to foreign interest rate shock is different from that under current-looking monetary policy. Last, 
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under foreign inflation shock, output, inflation and interest rate increase, rather than decrease. 
This is different from their responses under current-looking monetary policy. 
Under fixed exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy, output, inflation and 
interest rate increase in response to an unanticipated tightening of monetary policy. Under 
technology shock and foreign interest rate shock, output increases permanently. Inflation and 
interest rate decrease permanently. This response of domestic interest rate in the opposite 
direction of foreign interest rate shows the monetary policy independence under capital 
controls and fixed exchange rate regimes, in line with the Mundell-Fleming trilemma. The 
sunspot driven inflationary expectation increases output, inflation and interest rate. This 
reflects the fact of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
When the monetary policy is forward-looking under fixed exchange rate regime, technology 
shock increases output and decreases inflation and interest rate. Inflation and interest rate first 
increase and then decrease in response to foreign interest rate shock. These are different from 
their responses under current-looking monetary policy. And it also shows that the monetary 
policy is not completely independent when it is forward-looking, which slightly deviates from 
the Mundell-Fleming trilemma. 
 
1.6.6. Variance Decomposition 
 
The variance decomposition results provide the contributions of each shock to the 
fluctuations in output gap, inflation and interest rate. 
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Under the flexible exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy in China, 
foreign interest rate shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (45.51%), 
inflation (56.84%) and interest rate (32.28%). Foreign inflation shock also makes important 
contribution. It explains the fluctuations in output gap (30.16%), inflation (21.38%) and 
interest rate (20.81%). 
When monetary policy is forward-looking under the flexible exchange rate regime, foreign 
inflation shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (51.1%) and inflation 
(63.15%). Monetary policy shock contributes to 79.61% of fluctuation in interest rate. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime and current-looking monetary policy, technology 
shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (45.53%), inflation (69.06%) and 
interest rate (58.23%). Foreign interest rate shock explains the fluctuations in output gap 
(46.61%), inflation (28.55%) and interest rate (24.79%). 
When monetary policy is forward-looking under the fixed exchange rate regime, 
technology shock still contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (61.76%), inflation 
(91.8%) and interest rate (62.68%). 
 
1.6.7. Robustness: United States 1954(3) to 1971(4) and 
1980(1) to 1985(4) 
 
Data Description 
As the robustness test, we use quarterly postwar U.S. data on output, inflation, and nominal 
interest rates from the database, FRED. We consider the following two sample periods: 1954(3) 
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to 1971(4) and 1980(1) to 1985(4). These two periods are during and right after the Bretton 
Woods System, during which the U.S. was imposing capital controls. During the first sample 
period, the U.S. dollar was tied to gold, while after the Bretton Woods System had ended, the 
link to gold was terminated.  The U.S. dollar became a freely floating fiat currency. The models 
of Case 1 and Case 3 are fitted to the data of 1980(1) to 1985(4), while Case 2 and Case 4 are 
fitted to the data of 1954(3) to 1971(4). 
The output gap is calculated as the log of real GDP minus the log of real potential GDP. 
Inflation is calculated as the log of the CPI. The nominal interest rate is the Effective Federal 
Funds Rate. 
Notice that the period of 1954(3) to 1971(4) in U.S. is the time under passive interest rate 
feedback to inflation, so we set the prior mean of a to be 0.8. While during 1980(1) to 1985(4) 
in U.S., the interest rate feedback to inflation is positive. We set the prior mean of a to be 1.1. 
Parameter Estimation 
As the robust test, under flexible exchange rate regimes and current-looking monetary 
policy, the U.S. results show some difference. The posterior mean of interest rate feedback to 
inflation a  is 6.18. And the interest rate feedback to output gap xa  is 0.28. Indeterminacy 
influences the transmission of monetary policy shock and foreign inflation shock.   is 0.37, 
which shows that the price is flexible. 
The estimation results for U.S. under flexible exchange rate regimes and forward-looking 
monetary policy shows that the posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 
1.66. And the interest rate feedback to output gap xa  is 0.41. Indeterminacy influences the 
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transmission of monetary policy shock and foreign inflation shock.   is 0.96, which shows 
that the price is sticky. 
Compared with China, under fixed exchange rate regimes and current-looking monetary 
policy in U.S., the posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 6.91. And the 
interest rate feedback to output gap xa  is 0.33. It is a little out of expectation that the interest 
rate feedback to inflation is positive, since this feedback is assumed to be passive during the 
Bretton Wood System. There exist some correlations between fundamental shocks. And 
indeterminacy can influence the transmission of structural shocks related to monetary policy, 
technology and foreign interest rate.   is 0.23, which shows that the price is flexible. 
Under fixed exchange rate regimes and forward-looking monetary policy, the U.S. results 
show that the posterior mean of interest rate feedback to inflation a is 1.25. And the interest 
rate feedback to output gap xa  is 0.38. There exist some correlations between fundamental 
shocks. And indeterminacy can influence the transmission of structural shocks related to 
monetary policy, technology and foreign interest rate. 
Posterior Probability of the Determinate and the Indeterminate Regions 
Under flexible exchange rate and current-looking monetary policy, the probability of 
indeterminacy region of US is smaller than that of China. Under flexible exchange rate and 
forward-looking monetary policy, the probability of indeterminacy region of US is larger than 
that of China. Under fixed exchange rate and current-looking monetary policy, the probability 
of indeterminacy region of US is larger than that of China. Under fixed exchange rate and 
forward-looking monetary policy, the probability of indeterminacy region of US is larger than 




Under both flexible exchange rate and fixed exchange rate with current-looking monetary 
policy, the responses of output gap, inflation and interest rate under foreign interest rate shock 
are different from those of China. In US, the inflation and the interest rate firstly decrease and 
then increase. The response of interest rate reflects a certain degree of monetary policy 
independence. The US economy is less influenced by the sunspot shock. 
Under flexible exchange rate and forward-looking monetary policy, the impulse responses 
of output gap, inflation and interest rate to foreign inflation shock are different from those of 
China. All of them decrease under this shock. The US economy is less influenced by the 
sunspot shock. 
Under fixed exchange rate and forward-looking monetary policy, the impulse responses of 
output gap, inflation and interest rate to foreign interest rate shock are different from those of 
current-looking monetary policy. Different from the case of China, the interest rate directly 
decreases in response to foreign interest rate shock. Different from the other three cases of US, 
the sunspot shock takes effect on output gap, inflation and interest rate. 
Variance Decomposition 
As the robustness test, the U.S. variance decomposition results shows that under flexible 
exchange rate regimes and current-looking monetary policy, monetary policy shock explains 
37.17% of fluctuation in output gap. Technology shock contributes to 38.22% of fluctuation 
in inflation and 39.11% of fluctuation in interest rate. Foreign interest rate shock contributes 
to 29.79% of fluctuation in output gap, 33.72% of fluctuation in inflation and 34.75% of 
fluctuation in interest rate. When monetary policy is forward-looking, foreign inflation shock 
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contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (57.16%), inflation (52.49%) and interest 
rate (51.4%). 
Under fixed exchange rate regimes and current-looking monetary policy, foreign interest 
rate shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in output gap (63.52%), inflation (65.83%) 
and interest rate (67.97%). When monetary policy is forward-looking, foreign interest rate 




1.7. Numerical Bifurcation Analysis 
 
In this section, we detect bifurcation numerically. In line with our former analysis, we find 
numerically that bifurcation exists under fixed exchange rate regimes and current-looking 
monetary policy. We used MatContM and Mathematica to perform the computations. We find 
that at certain values of the deep parameters, the dynamical system becomes unstable. Several 
kinds of bifurcation appear at those values, both when computed forward and backward at 
those values. Notice that xa  and a  are the interest rate feedback in the Taylor rule to the 
output gap and to inflation respectively. We find that when capital controls are imposed, policy 
makers should be cautious, when adjusting the nominal interest rate under fixed exchange rate 
regimes with current-looking monetary policy. 
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As the results summarized in Table 37, at a = 4.88 and b = 3.88, we find a branch point 
and it is unstable improper node. Selecting this branch point as initial point and keep 
computing backward, we get a bifurcation where another branch point shows up. At a = 4.85, 
b = 3.85, we find the same types of bifurcation as above. At a = 4.85, b = 1, we detect a 
neutral saddle and it is unstable improper node. At a = 4.85, b = -5.85, we find a period 
doubling point and it is saddle point. 
Since the values of a and b are also functions of the monetary policy parameters and deep 
structural parameters, it is able to be identified that certain values of monetary policy xa  and 
a will lead the economy into instability. And these values should be where the policy 




We investigated the dynamical properties and stability of the macroeconomy under capital 
controls. Conditional on different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies, we classified 
our analysis into four different cases. We show that under certain conditions of the deep 
parameters and monetary policy parameters, the macro economy will have multiple equilibria 
and can be unstable, especially under fixed exchange rate regimes and current-looking 
monetary policy. Monetary authorities need to be cautious, when they make policy decisions 
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with capital controls. Only when taking these complexities into consideration, can macro-
prudential policy with capital controls play its role in stabilizing the macro economy. The 
common view that capital controls  can  provide a simple solution to difficult problems can be 
seriously misguided, producing unanticipated risk. The economy could become trapped in a 
worse equilibrium or in an instability region, leading the economy onto a volatile path. 
Under capital control, policy makers could move the economic system from indeterminate 
equilibria to determinate equilibrium by adjusting non-fundamental forecasting error to the set 
of fundamental shocks.  One method, would be by changing people’s belief. An altnermative 
method, more directly under government control, would be by changing the value of policy 
parameters to move the system from an instability region to stability region.  
We assume purchasing power parity, thereby removing the dynamics of terms of trade and 
exchange rates from the dynamical systems. Extensions of our model could permit solving for 
the dynamics of exchange rates and terms of trade. In addition, some of our results produce 
indeterminacy, and some produce deterministic business cycles without stochastic shocks. 
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Table 1: Capital Account Openness Index 









Notes: Overall Openness Index is the unweighted average of the openness of twelve types 
of asset categories: equity, bond, money market, collective investment, derivates and other 
instruments, commercial credit, financial credit, direct investment, direct investment liquidation, 
guarantees, real estate and personal capital transaction. Range between 0 to 1 (1 indicates fully 
liberalized). 









Table 2: Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy Framework 
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Framework 
Algeria Other managed arrangement Monetary aggregate target 
Bangladesh Stabilized arrangement Monetary aggregate target 
Brazil Floating Inflation-targeting framework 
China Other managed arrangement Monetary aggregate target 
India Floating Inflation-targeting framework 
Mexico Free floating Inflation-targeting framework 
Thailand Floating Inflation-targeting framework 
Turkey Floating Inflation-targeting framework 












Table 3: Indeterminacy Conditions 
Policies Indeterminacy conditions 
Capital control, 
Flexible exchange rates, 
Current-looking monetary policy 
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0xa a        
Capital control, 
Fixed exchange rates, 
Current-looking monetary policy 
2( 1) ( 1) [ ( 1) ] 0xa a             
Capital control, 
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Forward-looking monetary policy 
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Table 4: Bifurcation Conditions 
Policies Bifurcation conditions Possible 
Case 1 
2 2[( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1) (1 ) 0
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Table 5: Prior Distributions-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy, 
China 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 1.1000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
z  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
R  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
M  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
56 
 
R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 
  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 










90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  2.3296 0.0775 2.2824 2.4474 
xa  0.4600 0.0274 0.4109 0.4776 
ω 0.9888 0.0002 0.9886 0.9891 
*  4.7341 0.0011 4.7328 4.7348 
*r  0.2246 0.0573 0.1762 0.2697 
  0.7383 0.1432 0.6542 0.9976 
z  0.9778 0.0057 0.9653 0.9804 
R  0.9707 0.0095 0.9683 0.9876 
  0.6387 0.0174 0.6317 0.6653 
zR  0.9596 0.0181 0.9434 0.9740 
z  -0.6645 0.0419 -0.7095 -0.6481 
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R  -0.4416 0.0556 -0.5323 -0.4128 
rM   -0.2613 0.1750 -0.6390 -0.1439 
zM   -0.6844 0.1165 -0.7770 -0.4905 
RM   -0.6962 0.1780 -0.8476 -0.3938 
M  0.3297 0.1516 0.2239 0.5487 
r  0.6276 0.0171 0.5985 0.6384 
z  0.2537 0.0210 0.2359 0.2996 
R  0.5105 0.0256 0.4827 0.5256 
  0.3867 0.0146 0.3853 0.3955 





Table 7: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking 




Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
 
 
Table 8: Variance Decomposition-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary 
Policy, China 









































Notes: This table reports the posterior mean and 90% probability intervals. 
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Table 9: Prior Distributions-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy, 
China 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 0.8000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 












 90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  0.2233 0.1079 0.0490 0.3929 
xa  0.2228 0.1304 0.0307 0.4100 
ω 0.5238 0.0403 0.4569 0.5904 
*  1.6333 0.4921 0.8176 2.4383 
*r  0.8588 0.3797 0.2562 1.4656 
φ 3.5772 0.8794 2.1815 4.9473 
z  0.9271 0.0464 0.8631 0.9991 
R  0.6162 0.1577 0.3973 0.9181 
zR  0.7459 0.0000 0.7459 0.7459 
rM   -0.4526 0.0000 -0.4526 -0.4526 
zM   0.3725 0.0000 0.3725 0.3725 
RM   -0.2618 0.0000 -0.2618 -0.2618 
r  0.1456 0.0211 0.1123 0.1787 
z  0.3814 0.0463 0.3074 0.4582 
R  0.3775 0.0722 0.2559 0.4898 
  0.0986 0.0145 0.0751 0.1210 






Table 11: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking 




Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
 
 
Table 12: Variance Decomposition-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary 
Policy, China 
































Notes: This table reports the posterior mean and 90% probability intervals. 
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Table 13: Prior Distributions-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy, 
China 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 1.1000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8500 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
z  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
R  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
M  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
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R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 
  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 






Table 14: Parameter Estimation Results-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 




90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  0.5865 0.0828 0.5391 0.6395 
xa  0.4208 0.0202 0.4063 0.4515 
ω 1.0336 0.0021 1.0322 1.0362 
*  4.7384 0.0081 4.7321 4.7513 
*r  0.4026 0.1295 0.2939 0.5384 
  1.2647 0.0715 1.2209 1.3865 
z  0.8178 0.0082 0.8017 0.8187 
R  0.2214 0.0186 0.2061 0.2289 
  0.8800 0.0118 0.8645 0.8847 
zR  0.5536 0.0555 0.4776 0.5935 
z  -0.9811 0.0207 -0.9883 -0.9745 
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R  -0.3931 0.0507 -0.4219 -0.3351 
rM   -0.2957 0.1272 -0.3137 -0.0037 
zM   0.4469 0.1332 0.2856 0.5151 
RM   0.0437 0.1892 -0.1567 0.2854 
M  -0.4836 0.1460 -0.5804 -0.3983 
r  0.4161 0.0154 0.4003 0.4249 
z  0.3233 0.0104 0.3213 0.3364 
R  0.2343 0.0141 0.2170 0.2439 
  0.4184 0.0122 0.4020 0.4257 







Table 15: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 








Table 16: Variance Decomposition-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary 
Policy, China 



















































Table 17: Prior Distributions-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy, 
China 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 0.8000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 











 90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  0.3053 0.1138 0.1186 0.4917 
xa  0.2931 0.1478 0.0563 0.5139 
ω 0.6624 0.0291 0.6152 0.7109 
*  1.5837 0.5183 0.7034 2.3970 
*r  0.7854 0.3560 0.2126 1.3447 
φ 2.6055 0.7281 1.4279 3.7583 
z  0.9423 0.0406 0.8882 0.9996 
R  0.5040 0.1079 0.3299 0.6768 
zR  0.2947 0.0000 0.2947 0.2947 
rM   -0.9480 0.0000 -0.9480 -0.9480 
zM   0.0991 0.0000 0.0991 0.0991 
RM   -0.2598 0.0000 -0.2598 -0.2598 
r  0.2272 0.0306 0.1781 0.2759 
z  0.3278 0.0452 0.2567 0.3984 
R  0.2148 0.0403 0.1499 0.2759 
  0.1049 0.0145 0.0815 0.1277 




Table 19: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 








Table 20: Variance Decomposition-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary 
Policy, China 









































Table 21: Prior Distributions-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy, 
US 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 1.1000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
z  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
R  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
M  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
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R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 
  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 






Table 22: Parameter Estimation Results-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking 




90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  6.1792 0.7510 4.9870 7.4904 
xa  0.2792 0.1573 0.0409 0.5139 
ω 0.3719 0.0395 0.3138 0.4360 
*  1.7728 0.1161 1.6309 1.9677 
*r  1.2393 0.6070 0.5059 2.0725 
  2.7482 0.3937 2.1763 3.3829 
z  0.9156 0.0152 0.8855 0.9390 
R  0.8957 0.0215 0.8598 0.9315 
  0.9099 0.0159 0.8850 0.9412 
zR  0.6171 0.0000 0.6171 0.6171 
z  -0.7198 0.0000 -0.7198 -0.7198 
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R  0.1020 0.0000 0.1020 0.1020 
rM   0.0354 0.4684 -0.5633 0.9368 
zM   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RM   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
M  0.0000 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006 
r  0.1624 0.0261 0.1218 0.1946 
z  0.3721 0.0501 0.2795 0.4289 
R  0.3818 0.0378 0.3190 0.4345 
  0.3856 0.0500 0.3030 0.4555 




Table 23: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking 








Table 24: Variance Decomposition-Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary 
Policy, US 


















































Table 25: Prior Distributions-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy, US 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 0.8000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 











 90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  6.9062 0.3601 6.3201 7.3460 
xa  0.3320 0.1708 0.1109 0.6141 
ω 0.2334 0.0209 0.1987 0.2641 
*  1.3130 0.0096 1.2985 1.3303 
*r  0.4458 0.0529 0.3543 0.5315 
φ 2.1193 0.2347 1.8307 2.5244 
z  0.7233 0.0220 0.6915 0.7555 
R  0.7051 0.0241 0.6699 0.7420 
zR  0.9994 0.0005 0.9991 0.9998 
rM   -0.0775 0.4253 -0.8105 0.6001 
zM   0．0767 0.3540 -0.4332 0.6998 
RM   0.0763 0.3531 -0.4364 0.6973 
r  0.1134 0.0114 0.0988 0.1358 
z  0.4786 0.0743 0.3796 0.5921 
R  0.7335 0.0816 0.6235 0.8522 
  0.3011 0.1147 0.1442 0.4671 





Table 27: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking 








Table 28: Variance Decomposition-Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary 
Policy, US 








































Table 29: Prior Distributions-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy, 
US 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 1.1000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8500 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
z  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
R  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
M  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
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R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 
  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 








Table 30: Parameter Estimation Results-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 




90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  1.6570 1.0416 0.1924 2.4429 
xa  0.4131 0.0554 0.3542 0.5074 
ω 0.9640 0.0041 0.9560 0.9682 
*  1.5950 0.0036 1.5884 1.5997 
*r  0.5024 0.0798 0.3780 0.6295 
  0.8224 0.1651 0.5538 1.0051 
z  0.8792 0.0161 0.8624 0.9046 
R  0.8897 0.0013 0.8874 0.8913 
  0.8577 0.0077 0.8467 0.8677 
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zR  0.5246 0.0000 0.5246 0.5246 
z  -0.6810 0.0000 -0.6810 -0.6810 
R  0.2662 0.0000 0.2662 0.2662 
rM   -0.0669 0.2944 -0.4287 0.4202 
zM   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RM   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
M  0.0000 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
r  0.1017 0.0050 0.0952 0.1113 
z  0.2072 0.0382 0.1662 0.2516 
R  0.2725 0.0374 0.2241 0.3192 
  0.3018 0.0409 0.2558 0.3646 







Table 31: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 








Table 32: Variance Decomposition-Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary 
Policy, US 









































Notes: This table reports the posterior mean and 90% probability intervals. 
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Table 33: Prior Distributions-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy, US 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
a  Gamma 0.8000 0.5000 
xa  Gamma 0.2500 0.1500 
ω Beta 0.8000 0.1000 
*  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
z  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
R  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zR  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM   Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
r  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
z  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
R  Inverse Gamma 0.3000 4.0000 











 90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
a  1.2520 0.0437 1.2025 1.3038 
xa  0.3807 0.0449 0.3228 0.4413 
ω 0.1430 0.0077 0.1327 0.1530 
*  2.8632 0.0369 2.8170 2.9097 
*r  0.7741 0.0526 0.6957 0.8374 
φ 3.8277 0.0000 3.8277 3.8277 
z  0.8595 0.0635 0.7984 0.9419 
R  0.7576 0.0979 0.6392 0.8794 
zR  0.9823 0.0118 0.9726 0.9904 
rM   -0.6621 0.0468 -0.7368 -0.6074 
zM   0.0192 0.1281 -0.1577 0.1252 
RM   -0.1151 0.1419 -0.3249 0.0083 
r  0.1093 0.0030 0.1045 0.1116 
z  0.1791 0.0022 0.1752 0.1814 
R  0.2200 0.0148 0.2027 0.2418 
  0.0455 0.0015 0.0435 0.0475 






Table 35: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking 









Table 36: Variance Decomposition-Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary 
Policy, US 

























































Origin Bifurcation continuation 
Vary a (1) Branch point 





Backward Branch point 
(2) Period doubling 






Forward Resonance 1-2 
LPPD 
Vary b (3) Branch point 





Backward Branch point 
(4) Neutral saddle 






(5) Period doubling 



































































Appendix 1 Households Problem 
A representative household seeks to maximize 
















  ,                           
where tN  denotes hours of labor, tC  is a composite consumption index defined by 
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  . 
The household’s budget constraint takes the form 
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The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given by 
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Thus the budget constraint can be rewritten as 
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The log-linearized form is 
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where    
1
, 1t t t tR E Q

 and    
1
* *
, 1t t t tR E Q

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Appendix 2 Backus-Smith Condition 














t t i t
i











                                                                                                                        
1 1





i t t i t tt t t
i i
t t i t t i t t
C C C
C C C
     
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         
           
 
                                                           
where we define   and   to be the variables that captures the dynamics of 













Taking the log we get  1 1t t t      , 




t t t i tC C
  .                                                                                                                                          
Taking logs on both sides and integrating over i, we get 
* 1
t t t tc c q 







Appendix 3 Uncovered Interest Parity 
The pricing equation for foreign bonds and domestic bonds are respectively 
   








t t t t









                                                                                                                     
We combine them to get the Uncovered Interest Parity conditions, 
 * *, 1 , 1 0t t t t t t tE Q R Q R   ,                                                                                                            




R R   .  
Taking logs on both sides, we get                                                                                                                                    





t te e di   is the log nominal effective exchange rate. 










  . 













     . 
Taking logs, we get 
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t i ts s di   (when 1  ). 
Under the purchasing power parity condition, , ,H t F tP P , so that 1tS  . 
Log linearizing,     
1
1 1 1
, ,1t H t F tP P P
  
 
     
 
 becomes 
  , , ,1t H t F t H t tp p p p s       , when 1  . 
It follows that  
 , 1t H t t ts s        
and  
     1 , 1 1t t t H t t t tE E E s s         .                                                                                  
The bilateral nominal exchange rate is defined by the law of one price, 
, , ,( ) ( )
i
i t i t i tP j P j ,  
where , ( )
i
i tP j  is the price of country i’s good j, expressed in country i’s currency. 
It follows that , , ,
i






t i t di
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t i tp p di   is the log world price index. Combining the previous result with terms of 
trade, we get 
*
,t t t H ts e p p   .                                                                                                                         










We can rewrite the uncovered interest parity condition as 
   * 1 1t t t t t t tr r E E e e      . 
Since  1 1t t t      and
*
,t t H t te s p p   , it follows that 










Appendix 4 Equilibrium of Demand Side 
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    
             
  , 
  11t t t tY S C
          . 
The first-order log linear approximation is 
t t t ty s c    .                                                                                                                     
Substituting this into     1 1
1
t t t t t tc E c r E  

     , we get 
        1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t t t t ty E y r E E s s E                     .                           
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Appendix 5 Equilibirum of Supply Side 
At the steady state of the economy, we have 
t t ty a n  .                                                                                                                            
The real marginal cost is 
t t t t tmc c n s a        ,                                                                                                
while the steady state real marginal cost is 
mc   .  
The deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state is 
  1t t t t t t t t tmc mc mc c n s a y a                     . 
Thus at equilibrium, the dynamic equation for inflation is 










Appendix 6 Equilibrium Dynamics in Output Gap 
The natural level of output is defined to be the equilibrium output in the absence of nominal 









    
 
.   
The output gap is defined to be the following deviation of output from its natural level: 
t t tx y y  , so that  
1
1 1





      
  
. 
We substitute that equation into the dynamics of output and inflation and also substitute
1t  into the expression of , 1H t   to acquire 
       1 , 1 1 1
1
t t t t t H t t t t t t tx E x r E E a a E

   

   
                
,                             
   , , 1 1H t t H t tE x       ,                                                                                          
together with the uncovered interest parity condition 
       * *1 1 , 1 1t t t t t t t t t H t t tr r E E s s E E                   . 
The above three equations constitute the dynamics of the economy with capital controls and 
flexible exchange rates, but without monetary policy.  
If the exchange rate is fixed, then 1t te e  , so that   
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     *, 1 1 1t H t t t t t tE E E s s        , 
 * 1t t t t tr r E       .  


















Appendix 7 Proof of Proposition 1 
Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, the 
system can be rewritten as 
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 ,
(1 )
( ) (1 ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ,
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The two-dimensional subsystem for the conditional expectations, Hxt t t
   ξ
  , where 
1( )
x
t t tE x   and , 1( )
H
t t H tE
    can be written as 
* * *
1 1t t t t  ξ Γ ξ Ψ ε Π η .  
     The eigenvalues for 
*
1Γ  are  
2
1 2



































Since the number of non-fundamental errors k = 2, when r = m = 1, there will be one degree 




Appendix 8 Proof of Proposition 2 
Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, the 
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The eigenvalues of matrix 
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1Γ  are  
2
1 2











































Appendix 9 Proof of Proposition 3 
Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, the 
system can be rewritten as 
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 ,
( 1) (1 )
(1 ) ( ) 1 [ ( ) ] ( ) ,
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The eigenvalues of matrix 
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Appendix 10 Proof of Proposition 4 
Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, the 
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The eigenvalues of matrix 
*
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Appendix 11 Proof of Proposition 5-8 
1. Case 1 





















,       
where A , B , E , and tZ  are defined the same as in Case 1 for indeterminacy. The 
characteristic equation is  





    . 











   

    
 
    

 
 This result follows. 
2. Case 2 
We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  
defined as in Case 2 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation and the bifurcation 
condition equations are the same as in Case 1, but with the different settings of A , B , E , and 
tZ . 
 This result follows. 
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3. Case 3 
We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  
defined as in Case 3 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation is  






    . 













   

    
 
    

 
 This result follows. 
4. Case 4 
We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  
defined the same as in Case 4 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation and the bifurcation 
condition equations are the same as in Case 3, but with different settings of A , B , E , and tZ . 




























Under the floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate is known as highly volatile, 
nonstationary. It is also hard to be explained and predicted by fundamentals, such as output, 
price level and monetary supply. This paper is trying to use a continuous time diffusion process 
to model the above characters of exchange rate dynamics. Both nonparametric method and 
parametric method (MLE) are used to estimate exchange rate as a diffusion process. In line 
with previous literature’s finding, the nonparametric drift estimators show some nonlinearity. 
The result of parametric estimation shows that Geometric Brownian Motion process could be 
a quite good capture of the exchange rate dynamics. 
 
2.2. Litereture Review 
 
Firstly, for the estimation of diffusion process, lots of existing literature have estimated the 
interest rates or the prices of derivative securities as diffusion processes. Earlier diffusion 
models have to rely on parametric or semi-parametric specifications for the drift and diffusion 
functions in order to implement available estimation methods based on discretely observed 
data. However, both parametric and semiparametric specifications impose very strong and 
unrealistic assumptions on the underlying process of the model. With the development of 
estimation methods, Ait-Sahalia (1996) proposed a nonparametric diffusion function estimator 
based on the linear mean-reverting drift function for the strictly stationary diffusion processes. 
Jiang and Knight (1997), Stanton (1997) assumed both drift function and diffusion function 
are unknown and used nonparametric method to estimate them. In addition, Stanton (1997) 
found evidence of substantial nonlinearity in the drift. Jiang and Knight (1997, 2nd) performed 
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Monte Carlo simulation to compare parametric versus nonparametric estimation of diffusion 
process. 
Secondly, for the estimation of exchange rate, Cai et al (2012) used functional-coefficient 
model for the conditional mean and a GARCH type model with a policy dummy variable for 
the conditional volatility. They found that the USD/CNY exchange rate is nonstationary and 
has an obvious decreasing time trend. So they chose the return of exchange rate (the scaled 
logarithm difference) as the objective to study. 
 
2.3. Model and Data 
 
Observed from the exchange rate data under a floating regime, the exchange rate is highly 
volatile and nonstationary, but without an obvious increasing or decreasing time trend. Thus a 
diffusion process might be a good capture of these characters. My main objective here is to 
study the exchange rate dynamics ( tE ). However, I will still show a description of the return 
series (ln (Et)-ln (Et-1)). In addition, when the Maximum Likelihood method is used in the 
estimation of drift and diffusion parameters for the exchange rate process, we also need the 
help of the return series. 
A general diffusion process considered is  
( ) ( )t t t tdE E dt E dW    
Kernel density estimation is used to estimate the density of exchange rate. The drift 
function and diffusion function are estimated by Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric estimation. 
The bandwidth is calculated using Scott’s rule (i.e., bw = len^(-1/5)*sd(x)), where 
118 
 
len=length(x) is the number of observed points of the diffusion path. Besides Scott’s rule, I 
also use other bandwidth values to compare the differences. 
Since exchange rate series is nonstationary, there exist problems on the nonparametric 
estimation of drift function as stated in Jiang and Knight (1997, 2nd). “The nonparametric drift 
function estimator requires stronger conditions and the stochastic process must be at least 
asymptotically stationary in the strict sense. This excludes the application of the proposed 
nonparametric drift function estimator to such processes as Brownian motion with drift and 
geometric Brownian motion. Both the Brownian motion with drift process and the geometric 
Brownian motion process are nonstationary. Since the Brownian motion with drift process is 
neither strictly stationary nor has a limiting probability density function, the aforementioned 
nonparametric drift function estimator cannot be applied.” 
Thus if we assume the nonstationary exchange rate series follows the Geometric Brownian 
Motion process (drift function and diffusion function are both linear), 
t t t tdE E dt E dW    
Parametric method should be used to estimate the drift and diffusion. I will use the 
Maximum likelihood method to estimate μ and σ. 
The Maximum likelihood estimation procedure is as follows, 
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The maximum likelihood function is 
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mn    and ˆ v̂n   
After the MLE estimation of drift and diffusion, simulation is performed to see whether 
the simulated exchange rate series under Geometric Brownian Motion process is close to the 
real data. 
The data used in this paper is the nominal exchange rate indices (calculated as geometric 
weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates) by Bank of International Settlements. I used the 
United States’ daily data from October 3rd, 1983 to November 28th, 2016. 
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The dynamics of exchange rate is shown in Figure 18 and its summary description is 
provided in Table 38. The return series is shown in Figure 19 and its description is summarized 
in Table 39. Phillips–Perron test is performed and we can conclude that the exchange rate series 
is nonstationary and the return series is stationary. 





















Figure 19: Return ln (Et)-ln (Et-1) 
 











The Phillips-Perron unit root test for exchange rate shows the following results. 
 Title: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
   Test regression with intercept 
Residuals: 
Min             1Q           Median          3Q              Max  
    -6.0655        -0.2521        0.0035         0.2668          2.9064 
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate         Std. Error        t value          Pr(>|t|) 
     (Intercept)   0.0721580      0.0361971       1.993             0.0462 *   
y.l1       0.9993564      0.0003047       3279.849       <2e-16 *** 
  Signif.codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1‘ ’1 
 
  Residual standard error:0.4817 on 8648 degrees of freedom 
   Multiple R-squared:0.9992, Adjusted R-squared:0.9992  
F-statistic: 1.076e+07 on 1 and 8648 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Value of test-statistic, type: Z-alpha is: -5.7576  
aux. Z statistics 






The Phillips-Perron unit root test for return series shows the following results. 
Title: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Test regression with intercept 
Residuals: 
                Min           1Q               Median           3Q                Max  




   Coefficients: 
                              Estimate       Std. Error       t value      Pr(>|t|) 
   (Intercept) -5.150e-05      4.662e-05      -1.105        0.269 
   y.l1            -1.707e-03      1.202e-02      -0.142        0.887 
 
   Residual standard error: 0.003877 on 6917 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 2.913e-06, Adjusted R-squared: -0.0001417  
   F-statistic:0.02015 on 1 and 6917 DF, p-value: 0.8871 
   Value of test-statistic, type: Z-alpha is: -7073.474  
aux. Z statistics 







2.4.1. Nonparametric estimation of exchange rate 
 
Assume exchange rate follows the diffusion process 
( ) ( )t t t tdE E dt E dW   . 
 
























2.4.2. Estimation as Geometric Brownian Motion by MLE 
 
Assume exchange rate follows the Geometric Brownian Mothion 
t t t tdE E dt E dW   . 
 First, we need to test whether series of ln (Et)-ln (Et-1) is independent and normal. 
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Figure 26: ACF of ln (Et)-ln (Et-1) 
 




Figure 28: QQ-plot of ln (Et)-ln (Et-1) 
 
 
 Then, according to the MLE estimation procedure in section 2.3, 
21ˆ 0.528ˆ ˆ 5 4
2
3 8mn      
0.4ˆ ˆ 266255vn    
Thus 
( 0.5285348) (0.4266255)t t t tdE E dt E dW    
2.4.3. Simulation as Geometric Brownian Motion process 
 




Figure 29: Simulation result of GBM process 
 
We can see that the trend is similar to that of the real data. Thus Geometric Brownian Motion 
process is a good capture of the exchange rate dynamics. 
2.4.4. Nonparametric estimation of return 
 
Assume the reurn ln(Et)-ln(Et-1) follows the diffusion process 




















To sum up, in this paper, I use both nonparametric method and parametric method (MLE) 
to estimate exchange rate as a diffusion process. In line with the previous literature’s finding, 
the nonparametric drift estimators show some nonlinearity. This may be because that the 
exchange rate series is nonstationary. The result of parametric estimation shows that Geometric 
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